Skeptonomics

It appears that the conduit consortium is simply an extra layer of securitization. It reminds me of the way the lender of last resort function was implemented, sort of, with several noticeable failures, in the era preceding the creation of the Fed. It has the potential to further concentrate risk, like an Army Corps flood control project that can withstand a category 3 but not 4 storm—if there are any buyers.

From an equity standpoint, I think James Hamilton has it right:

In my opinion, part of what created the current problem was the perception that participants were too big and too many to fail. If the government won’t let Citigroup fail, could it allow a superconduit to go down?

I am skeptical of any claims for a feel-good, this-will-solve-all-the-problems fix. The reality is that someone must absorb a huge capital loss. The question we should be asking from the point of view of public policy is, Who should that someone be?

My answer is: the shareholders of Citigroup.

You write stuff and hope people read it. Clearly the recent discussion on this blog and elsewhere of whether there is a savings glut over there or a savings shortage over here ignores completely the argument I made this year in Challenge. Was my case really that weak?

2008 will be the year America debates climate change policy, hopefully without descending completely into election-year inanity. 2009 will be the year we get a policy. For an issue of this magnitude, that’s a fairly short time frame, so every turn of events counts.

Today Barack Obama has gone on record with his own approach. By my reckoning he got almost everything right, but there’s one huge missing piece. He is right on:

• setting a serious target: an 80% reduction in emissions by 2050 is the minimum we should aim for, if we take the scientific evidence seriously. We can get there only by starting soon and staying on course.

• capping carbon emissions: a cap is necessary if we are going to try to live within ecological limits, and it is far preferable to a carbon tax, as I’ve argued earlier on this august site.

• auctioning the permits: as Obama said, letting the cows out of the Barnes, “Businesses don’t own the sky, the public does…”

• rejecting offsets: he doesn’t even mention them.

• investing in a non-carbon future: we need basic R&D, infrastructure and other initiatives to turn our economy around.

The only element that’s lacking is a commitment to rebating most of the auction revenues back to the people on a per capita basis. Economically, this is necessary to protect real incomes and avoid a dangerous contraction of consumer demand. (The higher energy prices we will be paying under any reasonable cap will be in the hundreds of billions of dollars.) Politically, it is necessary to win support for tough limits on carbon emissions. After all, if it is true that we own the sky, we should share in the income it generates. Finally, a per capita rebate would constitute the most progressive income redistribution program since the New Deal, a big consideration at a time of spiraling inequality.

So how do you finance those green investments if you give the money back? Answer: by ending pork barrel subsidies to the nuclear and fossil fuel mafias ($24B give or take a few) and rethinking national security, for starters. NB: if rebating the auction proceeds on an equal share basis is highly progressive, withholding a big chunk of it for other uses is highly regressive. Finance public investment out of taxes.

Let me see if I understand this. When someone in Iraq or some other such country hires a private army, we call it a militia. When someone in the US hires a private army and sells it to the highest bidder, we call it a security firm. And the reason is?