Skeptonomics

This is serious:

The blue stuff is private sector financing of the US current account deficit; the red stuff is life support from foreign central banks and SIV’s (sovereign investment funds). Brad Setser points out, as he has from the beginning of his blog, that official flows (red) are greatly underestimated; by arithmetic logic they have to make up the difference between private flows and the current account.

But the point is clear: if the US were any other country (i.e. too big to fail), we would be in the grips of an economic crisis at this very moment. Foreign exchange would freeze up, essential goods would be unavailable, mass layoffs would ripple across the land, while the dollar would sink like a stone. This would be Mexico 1994, Argentina 2001.

But it’s not, at least not right now. By the grace of central bankers and oil fund managers we in the US get to sip our latte (or in my case Darjeeling) and muse on this question in tranquility. But the dollar keeps going down, and the governments that prop us up are taking really big losses. The talk now is of Wiley E. Coyote and Hyman Minsky.

OK, this is scary, but those of us who have followed the situation have been scared for years, and yet the crisis still hasn’t come. Maybe this is another false alarm. We have been in bailout mode for a long, long time.

Still, the risk of a rupture is real. My advice: progressive people need to start thinking systematically about the political environment we are likely to find ourselves in if all hell breaks loose. What narratives, based in reality or fantasy, will make sense of this catastrophe for the general public? Who will step forward to manage the crisis? How can we minimize the risk of an authoritarian surge?

And you think you’re paranoid?

One of fundamentals of contemporary economic wisdom is that short run fluctuations only affect short run output; in the long run it’s all about growth. Textbooks have dropped their chapters on business cycles and replaced them with fancy growth models. The short run is for speculators; the long run is for serious policy analysts. But what if it’s all wrong?

A recent paper by Cerra and Saxena, two economists at the Bank for International Settlements, argues that the economic costs of recessions and more serious crises tend to be permanent. According to their analysis, post-recession recovery does not generally return an economy to its pre-recession growth trend, but shifts the trend line down a notch. That is, periods of negative growth are not usually followed by periods of above-trend growth. Poor countries may be poor not because their growth rates during healthy periods are lower, but because they have more and deeper disruptions.

I am not in position to adjudicate, except to notice (1) most economists simply assume that recovery returns an economy to trend, (2) the issue is of enormous importance, and (3) if Cerra and Saxena are right, we need to rewrite the macro textbooks (again).

UPDATE: DeLong endorses the view that short run effects don’t last:

Which side am I on? I tell my undergraduates:

At a time horizon of 0-3 years, be a Keynesian: the most important things are the fluctuations in unemployment, in real demand, and in capacity utilization.

At a time horizon of 3-8 years, be a demand-side monetarist: you can assume (provisionally) that fluctuations in employment, real demand, and capacity utilization die out; the most important things are the fluctuations in the composition of real demand (investment vs. consumption vs. government vs. net exports) and in inflation- and deflation-causing nominal demand assuming (provisionally) stable growth of the economy’s productive capacity.

At a time horizon of 8 years or greater, be a sane supply-sider: the most important things are the processes of investment in physical, human, and organizational capital that raise the economy’s productive capacity

Menzie Chinn has done us all a service with his review of recent exchange rate theory, which I also skimmed in this. I was particularly intrigued by his reference to Frydman and Goldberg’s “Imperfect Knowledge Economics” approach. I read their article but not their book, and at the risk of thereby embarrassing myself offer these thoughts.

1. F&G are certainly right that a single model should not be expected to explain xrate movements over long periods of time because the market determinants are changing. This fits to a Kuhnian view: there are periods of “normal” trading, where movements respond predictably to economic news, and paradigm shifts—discontinuities in trading behavior.

2. PPP is a weak attractor at best. This is because the vast majority of transactions in international markets concern stocks, not flows. Forex markets are more like stamp or coin markets than markets in toothpaste, but PPP is based on the toothpaste template. Self-fulfilling prophecies can persist until the effects of currency misalignment are so disruptive that macro events force a correction; arbitrage doesn’t regulate. Any intermediate xrate would appear to be a statistical attractor due to mean reversion; is there any evidence that PPP outperforms other values in that respect?

3. F&G frame their argument in terms of forecasting, which on a practical level is certainly the test. The larger question, however, is whether their approach, or any of the alternatives, is consistent with the role assigned to xrates in micro models of international trade. This was the issue I raised in Challenge. The general answer, I still think, is that they don’t. F&G in particular present a view that, in theory, cannot be reconciled with strict comparative advantage. If a shifting bundle of macro fundamentals determine xrates, and if their weights change from one period to the next, how then can international prices be relied on to settle at levels that balance trade at the margin?

F&G end with the habitual sop toward trade orthodoxy, continuing the Hayekian tradition of deep insight into the process of markets combined with an inability or unwillingness to see that the normative view of markets has been eviscerated.

On November 1, Strike-Bike was locked out. The Nordhausen factory had been occupied by its workers since July 10, producing over 1800 bicycles. (You could order them in any color you want as long as it was red.) Now the court has taken over and the future of the operation is in doubt.

It’s always good when workers take an initiative, but the long term prospects were hardly rosy. This is one more instance in which a worker takeover occurred in response to the failure of capitalist owners, “lemon self-management” so to speak. There was self-exploitation as well: workers paid themselves just 10 euros an hour in their last-ditch attempt to keep the business going.

For a real test of self-organized production there has to be a level playing field: profits to be had by both owners and workers. And the goal would not be (only) to stave off insolvency, but to transform products and production methods for a better world.

*That’s Carbon Adjustment Tariff to you. It’s coming, probably, and here are some ideas for what form it should take.

The basic idea is simple: any country that gets serious about controlling carbon emissions will raise the price of the stuff, directly or indirectly. Because carbon inputs are important in many other goods and services, they will raise those prices too. If some countries take action on climate change and others don’t this will lead to distortions in global markets. Otherwise well-meaning governments might refrain from action, fearing the competitive effects. If the elasticities are particularly unfavorable, it is even possible that stringent regulation in one country could lead to an exodus of industry to places where carbon burns freely, resulting in an overall increase in global emissions.

So put a tariff on goods to offset price differences attributable to different carbon regimes. There isn’t an accepted name for the idea yet, so let’s call it a carbon adjustment tariff. The idea can be found in Warner-Lieberman and has been broached by heads of state in Paris and Berlin. It is difficult to see how individual countries can take the lead without it.

Good ideas can have bad consequences unless they are thought through, however. Here are three principles that ought to govern a CAT you could love.

1. A tariff schedule should be insulated as far as possible from self-interested manipulation. In a better world it would be the product of a representative and accountable global agency. In the shabby one we live in it should at least be the joint product of a subset of countries, rich and developing, that are willing to take some initiative.

2. All the money collected under such a tariff—repeat, all the money—should be returned in some fashion to the countries of origin, to finance green investment. Yes, I know a lot of this cash will be misspent, but it would be misspent in the collecting country too. The CAT must not become another means to suck scarce resources from South to North.

3. Some or all of the revenues should be held in escrow, pending the agreement of the trading partner to enter a “contract and converge” system under which it will approach a common per capita carbon emissions target. This money can sweeten a deal that should be made on its own merits.

It bears repeating: policies to forestall global warming are not only environmental policies. If they take their job seriously, they will have profound effects on national and global economies. They should be designed to be economically progressive and sustainable.