Bob Frank is a smart guy with progressive instincts. His take on economic policy today is probably what we will see in a Democratic administration in 2009. That’s why it’s worth pointing out that the conventional wisdom he channels is politically and intellectually bankrupt.
He wants us to raise taxes because of “the deficits”, conflating the government’s fiscal deficit with the country’s current account deficit. Aside from sewing the sort of confusion that educators should be pledged to dispel, this argument recycles the discredited “twin deficits” hypothesis of the 1990’s. Our external deficit, according to this view, is the product of our lack of savings, particularly public savings. (The fiscal deficit is a deduction from our national savings account.)
Been there, disconfirmed that. Over the course of the 90s the fiscal balance went from negative to positive, but the current account balance went down, down, down. Here’s how it looked:
Both the fiscal and current account balances are expressed as percentages of GDP, with bigger deficits pushing south. Except for a few years in the early 2000’s, the two balances move in opposite directions. Shrink the government deficit (or squeeze out a surplus) and watch the current account drop. Of course, simple correlations like this are just the beginning of the story, but even fancy manipulations don’t turn this negative relationship into a positive one.
As I’ve argued before and at greater length, while everything affects everything else, the current account determines savings to a far greater extent than the other way around. The trade deficit is a drag on incomes, made up by the borrowing we do when the money comes back to us in the capital account. That transmission mechanism is obvious and visible. What about the effects of savings on trade?
There are only two routes. Either low savings leads to higher GDP (Keynes) and therefore a higher trade deficit, or it raises interest rates, which boosts the value of the dollar, which feeds the trade deficit. The first is empirically marginal at the present time: the US trade deficit is not driven by faster growth rates here compared to abroad. Even if it were otherwise, fixing trade by inducing a recession is curing a disease by killing the patient. The second route is counterfactual at two crucial points: domestic savings (low) do not drive interest rates (low) in the US, and interest rates do not drive the value of the dollar. Both are controverted by the willingness of foreign central banks and sovereign investment funds to buy dollar assets, thus far without limit.
So there is no compelling economic argument for obsessing on savings.
The political case is even weaker. The Democrats have become the party of sacrifice. They worry about Social Security (yes, that’s mentioned in Frank) because it will become a net draw on savings ten years out, so we have to “fix” it. We have to raise taxes because the fiscal deficit (currently within the Maastrict limit imposed on the Eurozone) is bad for savings. It’s all about savings, and it’s all wrong.
My suggestions: (1) Deal with the current account directly. If we cannot get international cooperation on the dollar, create a system of tradeable import permits. Take urgent action to cut the demand for petroleum, good for our trade balance and the earth’s carbon balance. Take an honest look at industrial policy. (2) Accept a fiscal deficit of 2-3% of GDP, as long as it makes sense as a national income stimulant, and as long as a substantial portion of public spending goes to investment in people and technology. (3) Finance large increases in public investment and energy transition by drastically cutting military spending. With a more modest military we could make more alliances, fewer wars and enjoy greater true security.